Word count (excluding references and suggested readings): 3499 words According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude -a fitting object of favoring. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, on this view, the object has final value. If it is fitting to favor an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. Disvalue is connected in the analogous way to disfavoring, i.e. to con-attitudes. For a history of this fitting-attitudes analysis, or FA-analysis for short, see below. The label itself was
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
coined rather recently, though, in Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) .
Apart from the suggested conceptual linkage between value and attitudes, what's distinctive for this approach is that it treats deontic concepts as prior to the axiological ones: Value is explicated in terms of the stance that ought to be taken towards the object. That it is fitting to have a pro-attitude, that there are reasons to have it, or that the attitude in question is appropriate, required or called for, are different ways of expressing the deontic component in FA-analysis. On some versions, FA-approach is meant to be a meaning analysis of "valuable" or "good"; on other versions it is rather a real definition: an account of what value or goodness consists in.
It's often left unspecified who are the subjects of the deontic requirement, with the implication being that the requirement applies to anyone. Some versions of the analysis restrict the scope of 'ought' to those who are familiar with the object under consideration (Broad 1930) or to subjects who are 'like us' (Wiggins 1987) .
FA-format can also be applied to various concepts of relative value. Thus, an object x can be said to be valuable for P if it is fitting to favor x for P's sake (Darwall 2004 , Rønnow-Rasmussen 2007 . Value-for in this sense should be distinguished from value-relative-to: x is valuable relative to P if it is fitting for P (but not necessarily for others) to favor x. (For some difficulties with this suggestion, see Schroeder 2007 .) It is unclear whether FA-analysis can also be used to deal with the attributive uses of 'valuable' and 'good', as in "this is a good watch". (For a positive answer, cf.
Rawls' proposal below; for criticism, see Brännmark 2008.) One of the advantages of FA-analysis is that it to some extent demystifies values (Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004) . It makes their normative authority unproblematic and thereby solves the problem that was especially troublesome for G.E. Moore's treatment of value as a primitive concept. Moore was taken to task on this very issue by William Frankena (1942) and more recently by Stephen Darwall (2003) . On FA-account, on the other hand, there is no mystery in values being "intrinsically prescriptive," to use Mackie's terminology (Mackie 1977, p. 35 ). An object's value simply consists in it being such that one ought to take an appropriate stance towards it. To what extent, if at all, this undermines Mackie's famous "argument from queerness" is another matter. What makes values queer on his view is not just that they are essentially prescriptive, but that they are supposed to be objective at the same time.
Another advantage of the analysis lies in its meta-ethical neutrality.
Cognitivists and non-cognitivists alike can adopt the view that the evaluative is reducible to the deontic, as long as they are free to interpret deontic utterances in different ways. The same applies to the conflicts between moral realists and antirealists or between non-naturalists and naturalists. In this sense, then, the analysis is orthogonal to the main meta-ethical controversies.
A further advantage has to do with the versatility of this format of analysis. FAapproach easily lends itself to value pluralism. We can distinguish between different kinds of value in terms of different kinds of pro-attitudes or pro-responses that are fitting with respect to different objects. The latter can be admirable, desirable, pleasurable, awe-inspiring, etc. (Anderson 1993 and Swanton 2003, ch. 2 The versatility of FA-analysis also shows up in how easy it is to extend it to value relations. One object can be said to be more valuable than another if it is fitting to favor it more, equally valuable if it is fitting to favor both equally, incommensurable in value if the degrees of favoring that are fitting for each of them are incomparable in strength. If the deontic component in the analysis can be assumed to either consist in a requirement or in a permission, as the case may be, the set of possible types of value relations increases. Thus, for example, objects x and y can be said to be on a par if it is permissible to favor x more than y and also permissible to favor y more Whether this circularity is vicious depends on what the analysis is supposed to achieve. Wiggins, for one, is willing to admit the circularity but argues that, due to its "detour through sentiments", the analysis nevertheless is informative (Wiggins 1987: 189) .
It isn't obvious, however, that the relevant attitudes must be essentially 'thick' kinds of value cannot, it seems, always be cashed out in terms of different kinds of fitting responses. An example might be grace and delicacy -closely similar and yet different values. Responses that fit objects that exhibit these values do not seem to differ (Crisp 2005) . One might try to deal with this difficulty by suggesting that the analysis of thick values should specify not only the fitting responses but also the properties of objects that make those responses fitting. The hope would be that some of the value differences could then be accounted for in terms of these 'valuemaking' properties. However, when it comes to closely similar values, it might be impossible to disentangle value-making properties enough to make them fit to function as differentiae specificae in the analysis. 2000a, 2000b.) . Essentially, the difficulty is that there might exist reasons for pro-attitudes towards objects that aren't related to their value. These reasons might have to do with the value of the attitude itself, as opposed to that of its object.
Or they might come from deontological constraints on our attitudes and responses.
Such reasons obviously are of the 'wrong kind' from the point of view of the FAanalysis (however good they might be otherwise), since their presence does not make the objects valuable. But drawing the distinction between reasons of the right and the wrong kind, without assuming the notion of value as given, has proved to be difficult. To dissolve the problem, one might argue that reasons of the wrong kind don't exist: the apparent candidates aren't reasons for pro-attitudes towards the object but only reasons for pro-attitudes and pro-responses towards these proattitudes. Whether this is true is debatable and even if it is we would still need to Sidgwick defines "the ultimately good or desirable" as "that of which we should desire the existence if our desire were in harmony with reason" (Sidgwick 1884: 108) . Similar formulations appear in later editions. There is a "dictate of Reason" implanted in our notion of the good (Sidgwick 1907: 112 Furthermore, the analysis is extendable to value comparisons: "one might take the better to be that which is worthy of a greater love" (p. 25), where "greater love" is interpreted not as one that is more intensive, but as a dyadic attitude of preference (p. 26). Thus, "worthy of greater love" can also be rendered as "preferable"
[Vorzügliche]. It is noteworthy, though, that Brentano regards preference as a species of emotion (ibid.), rather than as a purely conative state. (Cf. Findlay 1970: 25f . For a modern Brentano-inspired approach to FA-analysis, see Mulligan 1998 .)
The FA-analysis makes a brief reappearance in the writings of C. D. Broad, who suggests "X is good" might be definable "as meaning that X is such that it would be a fitting object of desire to any mind which had an adequate idea of its non-ethical characteristics." (Broad 1930: 283) W. D. Ross opposes the idea. He agrees that statements of the form "x is good" can be paraphrased as saying that x is a "worthy" or "fit" "object of admiration," if x is an action or a moral disposition (cf. Ross 1939: 276, 278 ). Pleasant objects, on the other hand, are fitting objects of "satisfaction" (ibid.). But while the paraphrase in terms of satisfaction could be construed as an analysis of 'good', the same does not apply to admiration:
[A]dmiration is not a mere emotion; it is an emotion accompanied by the thought that that which is admired is good. And if we ask on what ground a thing is worthy of being thought to be good, only one answer is possible, namely that it is good. It would be absurd to say that a thing is good only in the sense that it is worthy of being thought to be good, for our definition of 'good' would then include the very word 'good' which we were seeking to define. (Ross 1939: 278f, his emphasis.) Ross' reasons for rejecting FA-analysis thus seem to be twofold. Firstly, the goodness of an object cannot consist in its being worthy of admiration since goodness is the very feature that makes the object worthy to be admired. Secondly, the attitude of admiration involves a judgment that the object admired is good. This would make any analysis of goodness in terms of admiration circular (if the analysis of admiration requires reference to the purported judgmental component of this attitude).
The foremost exponent of the FA-analysis in the twentieth century, A. C.
Ewing, rejects both these objections (see EWING, A. C.). In The Definition of Good, he defines "good" as "fitting object of a pro attitude" (Ewing 1947: 152) , with "pro attitude" being intended to cover "any favourable attitude to something" (p. 149), such as "choice, desire, liking, pursuit, approval, admiration" (ibid.). Cf. also Ewing (1939) , p. 9: "What is good is a suitable object of pro-attitudes, what is evil a suitable object of anti-attitudes. What is intrinsically good is a suitable object of a pro-attitude for its own sake." The notion of an attitude is here interpreted very broadly: it includes responses with strong behavioral components, along with purely mental states and dispositions. Ewing stresses that different pro-attitudes or combinations of such attitudes fit different kinds of valuable objects, which he takes to show that "good" can have different senses (Ewing 1947: 166f) . In response to Ross's objections, he argues that the reason why it is proper to admire anything must be constituted by the qualities which make the object of admiration good, but it does not follow that the thought that it is good must, if the admiration is to be justifiable, intervene between the perception of the factual Thus, (i) admiration is a fitting response because of the object's 'good-making' qualities and not because of its goodness. For this reason, (ii) the attitude of admiration need not involve or presuppose any judgment that the object admired is good.
Terms such as "fitting" or "worthy" might invite an evaluative reading. But on that reading, we would get a new circularity: x is valuable = it is valuable to have a pro-attitude towards x. According to Ewing, that an attitude is fitting means that it is an attitude one ought to take. In contrast to G. E. Moore, Ewing takes this deontic notion to be primitive. The relevant 'ought', however, is not the ought of moral obligation. It is not obvious that we are morally required to have a pro-attitude towards, say, pleasure, even though pleasure is a thing of value. Ewing argues that there are two primitive deontic concepts: the ought of fittingness and the moral ought.
It is the former that should be used in FA-analysis.
In Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy from 1959, Ewing modifies his view.
He now interprets the ought of fittingness as the ought of "reasonableness" (Ewing 1959: 86, 90) : That a pro-attitude is fitting with regard to an object means that the object justifies that attitude or provides reasons for it. Secondly, he suggests that some senses of 'good' should be analyzed in terms of the moral ought while for other senses the ought of reasonableness is appropriate (ibid.: 98f).
After Ewing, FA-analysis disappeared from the center of debate for several decades. It did get a short mention in Rawls's A Theory of Justice, where it was applied to the attributive usage of "good": "A is a good X if and only if A has the properties (to a higher degree than the average or standard X) which it is rational to want in an X, given what X's are used for, or expected to do, and the like (whichever rider is appropriate)" (Rawls 1971: 399) . Later on, it was also adopted by McDowell (1985: 118) , Chisholm (1986: 52) , Falk (1986: 117f) , Wiggins (1987: 206, 202f ), Gibbard (1990 Gibbard ( : 51, 1998 , Anderson (1993: 2, 17) and Lemos (1994: 12) . [Contrary to Moore, I believe that] being good, or valuable is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons. Since the claim that some property constitutes a reason is a normative claim, this account also [i.e., like Moore's] takes goodness and value to be non-natural properties, namely the purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind.
[…] it is not goodness or value itself that provides reasons but rather other properties that do so. For this reason I call it a buck-passing account. (Scanlon 1998: 97) By a "higher-order property" Scanlon doesn't mean a property of a property, as the standard use would have it, but a property of an object consisting in its having other properties that have a certain feature. One might put his proposal roughly as follows: x is valuable = x has properties that provide reasons for favoring x.
As we have seen, this buck-passing account of value can already be found in Ewing: " [T] he ground [for a pro attitude being fitting] lies not in […] goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good." (Ewing 1947: 172) The positive part of this account is implied by FAanalysis combined with the thesis of value supervenience: Given FA-analysis, the features on which the object's value supervenes make the object fitting to be favored, i.e. provide reasons for favoring it. It is different with the negative part, which is the buck-passing account's differentia specifica: FA-analysis, as such, need not exclude the possibility of value itself also being a reasonprovider for pro-attitudes and pro-responses. Still, it is tempting for the FAanalysts to accept the negative claim as well. However, even a buck-passer can treat value as a reason-provider in a secondary, epistemic sense. That an object has properties that are reasons for favoring it (which is what it is for it to be valuable) does not explain why we ought to favor it, but it still is evidence that we ought and to that extent itself is a reason to favor the object. It is not, however, any additional reason, over and above the properties that make the 
